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Chapter I -General Introduction 
1.1.  Background 
It is widely recognized that increased participation in international trade and 
investment can serve as an engine for economic growth and development.1 Implicit in 
international trade is the principle of comparative advantage that generally provides 
that states should trade with each other because they are better off by maximizing 
their production potential for some products and, through trade, obtain products they 
do not have or produce with less efficiency.2 Such comparative advantage, inter alia, 
presupposes a well-regulated trading system. Though attempts have been made to 
regulate the multilateral trading system by the GATT 1947 which was but meant to 
form only part of an agreement on the stillborn International Trade Organization (ITO), 
the first rule based World Trade Organization (WTO) was established only in 1995 and 
a number of countries have acceded to it thence.3
While there is no consensus on whether developing countries in general and the least 
developed countries (LDC s)4 in particular are beneficiaries of the system5, some 
                                                 
1 Historically, developing countries, which followed more liberal trade policies of ‘export promotion’, 
have experienced accelerated economic growth compared to those countries that followed more 
restrictive trade policies of ‘import substitution’. See Jessen (2005) 77f.  The majority of ‘emerging’ 
developing countries have grown rapidly over time under open trade policies or declining trade 
protection. See also Oyejide(2000)113-117. 
2 Jackson, et el, (2002) 7 
3 Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 by 75 GATT members and the European Communities, 
52 GATT members and more than 20 non-GATT members have acceeded to the organization.  See, 
WTO “ WTO accessions” <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ethiopia_e.htm > [last 
accessed on 31March, 2007]                                
4 Note that the WTO applies a system of self-selection to the categorization of members as developing 
countries. The sub-category of least-developed countries (LDCs) is, on the other hand, determined by 
means of the LDC list maintained and updated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Ethiopia is one of the LDCs according to this list. See, UNCTAD, “The UN list of LDCs 
after the 2006 triennial review” <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1> 
[accessed on 31March 2007] 
5It has now been established that trade liberalization efforts by a developing country are themselves 
insufficient to combat poverty. See Jessen(2005)78 ff. See also The International Development 
Research Center, “WTO accession: tough love or a heavy hand?”<http://www.crdi.ca/reports/ev-91906-
201-1-DO_TOPIC.html> [last accessed on 31 March, 2007] 
countries have embarked on the accession process.6 Ethiopia is one such country. 
Although Ethiopia had observer status at the WTO since 1997, a formal request for 
accession was circulated to WTO members only on 13 January 2003 and a working 
party for Ethiopia’s accession was established on 10 February 2003.7 The country has 
recently submitted the Memorandum of her Foreign Trade Regime to the WTO8. In 
fact, some WTO members have already started scrutinizing the same.9
 Presently, as always, agricultural trade negotiation under the WTO is quite 
controversial.10 While WTO members want a better concession in the multilateral 
trade negotiations in their favour, they rarely show willingness to forgo the protection 
they extend to agriculture. In fact, disagreement over some of the agricultural trade 
issues is one of the principal reasons behind the current Doha deadlock. In the WTO 
Director- General, Pascal Lamy’s own words: 
‘It is fair to note that in the current deadlock the main actors are the US on domestic 
subsidies, the EU on agricultural tariffs and emerging economies like India on market 
access also. Africa has maintained a very offensive position in the agriculture 
negotiations, because as you know for Africa, like other developing countries, agriculture 
holds a great growth potential because of its centrality to its economies.’11  
 
Thus, it is at the time when the incumbent members are grappling with the issues 
surrounding agricultural trade that Ethiopia, whose Economy predominantly relies on 
agriculture,12 is queuing to join the WTO. The decision is no doubt a critical policy step 
for a tough journey on a rough road. 
                                                 
6 Currently about 27 countries are negotiating WTO membership. See WTO “Understanding WTO 
Membership,<http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>[last accessed on 31 
March2007] 
7See WTO, “Accessions: Ethiopia”< http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ethiopia_e.htm> 
[last accessed on March31, 2007]. 
8 Ibid    
9See, for instance, Allafrica “WTO members begin grilling Ethiopia” 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200703200314.html> [last accessed on 31 March 2007] 
10 See WTO, “Agriculture: negotiations” 
< http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts07_e.htm> [last accessed on 27 May 2007]. 
See also generally Tangermann(2005) . 
11 Statement by WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy at the Africa Investment Forum 2006, 
Johannesburg, 9-11 October 2006.See also,WTO  “Africa’s agriculture, intra-trade to benefit from the 
Doha talks”< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl42_e.htm> [last accessed on 31 
March2007]
12 See, for instance, EEA (2005) Report on the Ethiopian Economy, Vol. IV (Addis Ababa, EEA) p.150. 
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1.2. Objectives of the Research 
 
The general objective of this study is to assess the possible implications of Ethiopia’s    
accession to the WTO for the agricultural sector in particular. In this light, the study 
has the following specific objectives: briefly discussing the arguments for and against 
accession to the WTO, examining agricultural trade liberalization under the GATT 
1947 and the WTO, assessing the future of agricultural trade negotiations within the 
WTO, analyzing the possible implications of such agricultural trade liberalization in the 
Ethiopian context, and drawing some conclusions and recommendations on possible 
measures to be taken. 
 
1.3.  Research Questions 
 
The main questions this thesis seeks to answer are: 
1. As to whether the existing Ethiopian laws and policies on agriculture are 
compatible with the WTO laws; and 
2.  What possible opportunities and challenges will the accession bring about for 
the Ethiopian agriculture?  
1.4. Significance of the Research 
Agriculture is a key economic sector for most African countries. For Ethiopia, the 
sector, although principally subsistence, accounts for about 45 percent of the GDP, 87 
percent of export trade and employs over 85 percent of the population.13 Cognizant of 
this fact, the government has adopted an economic policy that puts a high premium on 
agriculture. The policy is formally known as Agricultural Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI); and it is premised on the agricultural sector’s leading role 
towards industrialization, inter alia, by providing domestic market and also 
accumulating capital through export trade. 14
                                                 
13 EMFTR (2007) 4 
14 See EEA (2004) 264 
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Given the sensitive nature of agriculture, agricultural trade liberalization has, almost 
always, been approached with a rather slow and skeptic pace.15 In fact, divergence on 
some key issues relating to agriculture is one of the principal factors behind the 
suspension of the current Doha Round Trade Negotiations.16 When Ethiopia accedes 
to the WTO, therefore, she is expected to commit herself to liberalize trade in 
agriculture.  Exploring the WTO rules on Agriculture and the possible implications of 
such rules for Ethiopia is, therefore, a worthwhile and timely pursuit, as Ethiopia is 
currently negotiating WTO accession. Apart from contributing to the literature on the 
subject, the work is thought to stimulate further thinking and research among policy 
makers and other stakeholders alike.  
1.5.  Scope of the Research 
A detailed assessment and discussion of the implications of Ethiopia’s accession to 
the WTO on the agricultural sector can hardly be achieved in this thesis owing to the 
time and space limitations. This study neither extends to a commodity- by- commodity 
analysis nor purports to quantify the possible costs and benefits of the accession. It is, 
therefore, limited to the general implications of the accession for the sector in the light 
of the principal WTO laws regulating agriculture. 
1.6.  Research Methodology and Chapter Overview 
The study is essentially a library based one. Thus, a survey of literature has been 
undertaken. The WTO legal texts and official documents as well as relevant Ethiopian 
laws and official documents17have been explored as primary sources. Relevant books, 
scholarly articles and working papers are also examined as secondary sources with 
the view to assess the implications of the accession for the sector in the light of the 
experience of other countries. 
                                                 
15 See Desta  (2002) 8. 
16 See WTO “Africa’s agriculture, intra-trade to benefit from the Doha talks” 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl42_e.htm>[last accessed on 31March, 2007]
17As the preparation of the Schedule of Commitment has not yet been finalized, our reference will 
principally be the Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime. 
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The paper has five chapters. The first chapter deals with the general background of 
the study with the view to introduce the readers to the context of the work. The second 
chapter briefly describes the WTO and its basic rules. It also points out the general 
arguments for and against WTO accession and gives a brief account of the accession 
process. Although it is widely agreed that WTO accession is a step for integration into 
a global trading system, the accession process has increasingly become cumbersome 
as the acceding country has to, technically speaking, meet the demands from all 
incumbent members. 
The third chapter assesses the agricultural trade liberalization in the pre-WTO (the 
GATT 1947 era) and post WTO. Although agricultural trade liberalization has 
remained controversial, the WTO members have taken a remarkable step in 
disciplining agricultural trade through the negotiation of the agreement on agriculture 
(AOA) during the Uruguay round trade negotiations. Under the current Doha round of 
trade negotiations too, members have further expressed their willingness for a 
strengthened discipline on agricultural trade in the July 2004 Negotiations Framework 
and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declarations, although no concrete deal has so far 
been reached neither in agricultural nor non-agricultural trade. 
The fourth chapter, which is the main theme of this study, aims at assessing the 
possible implications of Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO for the agricultural sector in 
the light of the preceding chapters. In particular, the importance of the three pillars of 
the AoA: market access, domestic subsidy and export subsidy, for Ethiopia is 
explored. To the extent relevant, the July 2004 Framework and subsequent 
developments is also taken into consideration. In view of the close relationship 
between agricultural trade liberalization and food security, this chapter also briefly 
addresses the same.  
The fifth and last chapter of the paper draws some conclusions and provides for 
recommendations. 
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Chapter II-Accession to the WTO: General Overview 
2.1. Introduction 
The task of regulating the post World War II global trade was originally meant for the 
International Trade Organization (ITO), which, however, has never been 
established.18 Consequently the GATT 1947, which was meant only to form part of the 
ITO charter regulated the global trade system on provisional basis for nearly half a 
century; that is, until the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995. The WTO is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of 
trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, 
predictably and freely as possible19. This chapter briefly introduces the basic 
principles and rules of the organization, the rational for accession to the organization 
and the process of WTO accession in general. 
 
2.2. WTO: Objectives, Rules and Principles 
As spelt out in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(WTO),20 the main objectives of the WTO are: the increase of the standards of life, the 
attainment of full employment, the growth of real income and effective demand, and 
the expansion of and trade in goods and services.21 The need for the preservation of 
the environment and integration of developing countries into the world trading system 
is also part of the WTO objectives.22
The principal source of WTO law is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization and the numerous other agreements and understandings annexed 
                                                 
18 See Barton et el (2006) 14-21 and 30-36.The failure for the establishment of the ITO is principally 
attributable to the US’s refusal to ratify the Charter Establishing the Organization; and the ITO has often 
been referred to as the missed third leg of the Breton Woods institutions -the other two being the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
19See WTO “The World Trade Organization”<http://www.answers.com/topic/world-trade-
organization>[last accessed on 9 March 2007] 
20 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, concluded on 15 April 
1994,entered into force on 1 January 1995.  
21  See the preamble to the Agreement. 
22 Ibid 
thereto.23 As provided under Article II (2) of the agreement, the agreements and 
associated legal instruments included in the Multilateral Trade Agreements (Annexes 
1-3) are integral parts of the agreement and binding on all members while Plurilateral 
Trade Agreements (Annex-4) also form part of the agreement but only for those 
members which accepted them and are as such binding only on the latter. 
All these WTO laws are based on certain core principles and rules24. Perhaps the 
most important principle of the WTO is the principle of non-discrimination, which 
imposes the obligations of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment25 and National 
Treatment26 on members. The MFN principle requires a member to accord equal 
treatment to like products originating from all member states while the principle of 
National Treatment requires a member to accord the same treatment to like domestic 
(its own) products and products imported from other member states. In the absence of 
this principle of non-discrimination, it is hard to imagine a predictable global trading 
system. 
Other categories of WTO rules include: rules on market access (generally dealing with 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade)27, rules on unfair trade28, institutional and 
procedural rules pertaining to implementation of trade rules and settlement of trade 
                                                 
23  See generally WTO (1999). Other agreements and understandings annexed thereto include: 
Annex -1A    Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods: GATT 1994, Agreements on: Agriculture, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles Clothing (terminated on 1 January 2005), Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 
1994), Customs valuation (Article VII of GATT 1994), Preshipment Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import 
Licensing, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards;  
Annex- 1B General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
Annex-1C Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); 
Annex- 2 Dispute Settlement Understanding; 
Annex- 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and 
Annex- 4   Plurilateral Trade Agreements.  
24 For a complete analysis of the Rules and Principles of the WTO Law,generally see Bossche(2005).  
25 See GATT Article I. Notable exceptions to the GATT MFN principle are Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) provisions for developing and Least developed countries and the Regional Free Trade 
Agreements that offer preferential treatment. 
26 See GATT Article III 
27 These include: tariff barriers such as customs duties and other financial charges, and non-tariff duties 
such as quantitative restrictions, technical regulations, standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
customs formalities and government procurement practice. 
28 Although the WTO does not have an independent agreement on unfair trade practice, Agreements on 
Subsidies and countervailing measures, and Anti-dumping and Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights could at least in part serve such purpose. 
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disputes, and special rules on the spillover effects of free trade.29 It could, thus, be 
said that the WTO laws not only deal with trade liberalization; but also provide 
member states with policy space to address other overriding public interests. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that through time, the global trade under the 
GATT/WTO is increasingly transforming from mere trade liberalization through tariff 
reduction to trade regulations through harmonization of rules, thus dealing with 
policies which are intrusive of areas which used to be under the exclusive sovereignty 
of member states.30 At any rate, as the WTO is not a development organization and 
as such not primarily concerned with development,31 the extent to which a member 
would benefit from such trade liberalization and domestic policy space under the 
auspices of the WTO very much depends on its bargaining power which in turn 
depends on its economic and human power. 
2.3. WTO Accession: Meaning, Rationale and Process 
2.3.1. Meaning 
Initially there were two ways of acquiring WTO membership -original membership and 
accession. The first way to become a WTO member (original membership) was open 
to all contracting parties to the GATT 1947(and European Communities) until 1997 
according to which these parties could become members of the WTO simply by 
accepting the terms of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements; 
and making concessions and commitments for both trade in goods and services.32  
                                                 
29 These are special rules (exceptions) to the general rule of trade liberalization and aim at striking a 
balance between trade liberalization and other public interests. Such exceptions are found under 
Articles XII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIV of the GATT 1994,Articles V, X and XII of GATS, and the Agreement on 
Safeguards. See also, Bossche (2005) 15. In its looser sense, some scholars also consider such newly 
emerging (expanding) areas as competition, the spillover effects of trade liberalization by way of tariff 
reduction. See Barton (2006) 143. 
30 See for instance Barton, supra n. p 143-151  
31 Of course development is also an agendum at the WTO especially in the current Doha round of trade 
negotiations, Doha Development Agenda (DDA) as it is called. In actual terms, however, the issue of 
development is only ancillary to the principal concern of trade liberalization. Failure to agree on market 
liberalization concessions would definitely lead to failure to agree on development issues; but not 
necessarily the vice versa. 
32  See Article XI of the Agreement, supra n. 14. All parties to the GATT 1947 but Yugoslavia became 
members of the WTO in this way. 
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The second way to become a WTO member is through accession-on terms to be 
agreed between the acceding country or customs territory and other WTO members 
(incumbent members).33 WTO accession is indefinitely open to any state or customs 
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations 
and other matters provided for in the WTO agreement.34 The main problem with the 
accession process under Article XII of the WTO agreement, though, is the fact that it 
does not lay down a clear guideline as to the terms of WTO accession, which leaves 
an acceding country at the mercy of the incumbent members. In relation to this, 
international trade analysts, Evenett and Braga have observed the following: 
 
‘Paradoxically for rules based organization, the WTO has no clear rules for the 
“price” of membership. Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, the legal 
instrument covering the WTO accession process, merely states that new 
members may join the WTO “on terms to be agreed.” This sparse guidance 
leaves the door wide open to encompass both an expedited hassle-free 
accession process and a drawn-out, decade-long, and burdensome accession 
experience.’ 35
 
Admittedly, therefore, the parties to GATT 1947 would be in a better position, as most 
of them did not pass through the hurdles of WTO accession and hence through close 
scrutiny by other members although every member is presumed to have equal rights 
and obligations irrespective of the process by which it acquired membership. The 
more the WTO rules are shifting from liberalization on the basis of non-discrimination 
to harmonization of national laws (standards), the more intrusive the accession will be 
for acceding countries. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Id. Article XII. 
34  Ibid. Hong Kong China, Macao China and Chinese Taipei are among the customs territories that are 
members of the WTO. See the list of WTO members and observers 
at<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> [last accessed on 9 March 2007] 
35  Simon J.  Evenett and Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade Note, WTO accession: lessons from 
experience”<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/TradeNote22.pdf> 
[last accessed 20March, 2007] 
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2.3.2. Why WTO Accession? 
Although most WTO members were already parties to the GATT 1947 and hence 
joined the WTO under original membership track, a significant number of countries, 
including few Least Developed Countries (LDCs), have acceded to the WTO after its 
establishment in 1995.36 The proposition that countries would benefit from trading with 
one another seems to be less contentious. Quite contentious is, however, whether 
countries would benefit from acceding to the WTO, an organization primarily 
concerned with trade liberalization.  
The commonly provided benefits of WTO are:  predictability (of trading environment 
and hence also attraction of Foreign Direct Investment), transparency (about rules and 
provisions), market access (allowing market entry and export diversification), 
multilateral approach to trade (allowing participation through multilateral trade 
negotiations rather than bilateral agreements with trading partners).37  According to 
UNCTAD, LDCs can also be potential beneficiaries of WTO membership.38 On the 
other hand, accession to the WTO has a number of costs including: curtailment of 
                                                 
36 To date 22 countries have acceded to the WTO while 29 are on the process of accession. The LDCs 
that have so far acceded are: Nepal, Cambodia, and Vietnam (which was removed from UNCTAD’ s 
LDC list only recently). Ibid. 
37 Bhattacharya and Rahman(1999) “ The least developed countries in the WTO: strengthening 
participation capacities”<http://old.developmentgateway.org/download/104382/ldcunctad.pdf >[last 
accessed on 25March 2007] 
38 UNCTAD (1998). According to UNCTAD, the potential benefits for LDCs WTO membership include: 
• Trade liberalization, in the form of most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff reductions, the conversion 
of non-tariff barriers on agricultural products into bound tariff rates, the reduction of export subsidies 
and trade-distorting domestic support for agriculture, the phasing-out of the MFA, and the elimination of 
voluntary export restraints and other “grey area” measures; 
• Strengthened disciplines with respect to the application of non-tariff measures, notably 
contingency protection measures such as safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing measures; 
•  Enhanced transparency and stability in their own trade regimes, which increases efficiency, 
helps lock in economic reforms and enhances their ability to attract foreign direct investment; 
•   Specific provisions for differential and more favourable treatment, in terms of market access 
thresholds for contingency actions and more extended time-limits and flexibility in implementing the 
commitments; 
•   Clear rules for trade in agriculture and services and for intellectual property rights, which 
prevent unilateral actions; and 
•   A strengthened dispute settlement mechanism.  
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sovereignty and short-term maneuvering in trade-related policies; subjection of 
companies in vulnerable economies to stronger competition from developed country 
members; economic costs in terms of the opportunity costs of employing high skilled 
personnel for the implementation of WTO commitments and active participation in 
WTO negotiations; and the fiscal costs of reducing import tariffs may be significant 
because taxes on international transactions are a major source of government 
revenue in many LDCs.39  
In fact even where the perceived benefits of WTO membership cannot accrue to the 
members in reality, countries can hardly stay out of WTO membership given the role 
the organization is playing in the global trade and economic order. In this regard, 
Duncan Brack of the Royal Institute of International Affairs reached the following 
conclusion: 
 
‘For most countries, and particularly the poorest, there is no real alternative to 
joining the WTO. Weak though their position may be within the WTO, the option 
of trying to arrange bilateral or regional deals with neighboring countries is 
usually even more difficult, if it is available at all…And in any case, there are real 
advantages in WTO membership, including access to a multilateral rules-based 
structure which includes a dispute resolution system that can force much bigger 
and richer countries to dismantle – at least some – trade barriers.’ 40  
 
 
At any rate, translating the potential opportunities into real opportunities will depend on 
a number of factors. The extent to which LDC WTO members would be able to derive 
the benefits will depend on their capacity to, inter alia: formulate and pursue export 
oriented growth strategies commensurate with the current phase of globalization, take 
advantage of the emerging market access opportunities through diversification of both 
products and markets, fulfill multilateral trade obligations, design policies which 
comply with commitments under the WTO obligations; protect the trade rights which 
                                                 
39 Rolf and Matthias  (2001), “WTO negotiation and accession issues for vulnerable economies” 
Discussion Paper No. 2001/36 <http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/dp2001-36.pdf>[last 
accessed on 25 March 2006] 
40 Duncan Brack, Briefing Paper, “The world trade organization and sustainable development: 
a guide to the debate” <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/sdp/Dec05WTO.pdf>[last 
accessed on 21March2007] 
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are acquired through WTO membership; and  effectively pursue trade enhancing 
interests through negotiations in the WTO.41  
 
Although supply side constraints to diversify exports are definitely a critical handicap in 
utilizing such potentials for countries like Ethiopia, one can also hardly isolate the role 
of good governance at national level as an element of integration into the global 
economy. In this regard, P. Bossche, a renowned academic and the former acting 
advisor to the WTO Appellate Body also rightly noted that, ‘…international trade will 
not automatically lead to prosperity for all countries and for all people. Good 
governance is undoubtedly as important  [if not more] as international trade.’42
 
Therefore while WTO membership is admittedly seen as a step towards integration 
into the global trading system, accession to the WTO should not be seen as an end in 
itself. Apart from a careful accession negotiations, the actual integration into the global 
trading system and reap the potential benefits presuppose political commitment and 
sound macro economic policy (to the extent compatible with WTO rules) at national 
level. Effective protection of the rights obtained under the membership, which is 
limked to good governance, also plays a significant role in this regard. 
 
2.3.3. The Accession Process 
Once an acceding country has made a formal request and the WTO members 
accepted the request, a working party, which would facilitate the accession of that 
                                                 
41  Bhattacharya and Rahman(1999) “ The least developed countries in the WTO: strengthening 
participation capacities”<http://old.developmentgateway.org/download/104382/ldcunctad.pdf >[last 
accessed on 25March 2007] 
42  Bossche(2005) 18. At the risk of further generality, the term ‘good governance’ generally refers to a 
governance system, which ensures rule of law, participation, accountability, transparency, equity, and 
efficiency. See also Hope (2003) 1 wherein the former UN Secretary- General, Kofi Anan was quoted 
as saying, ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and 
promoting development.’ 
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particular country, would be established. The accession process thence would involve 
four main phases.43 
The first phase is submission of a memorandum of foreign trade regime, which 
explains the acceding country’s trade related laws and policies. This is usually called   
the ‘tell us about yourself’ phase. If the working party is satisfied with the contents and 
explanations of the memorandum, it will initiate bilateral trade negotiations between 
the acceding country and individual WTO members,44 the second phase in the 
accession process. The negotiations would essentially be about market access 
concessions and commitments; otherwise the WTO agreement and other multilateral 
trade agreements are not subject to negotiations as they constitute what is called a 
‘single undertaking’ which the acceding country shall subscribe to. 
A successful completion of bilateral market access negotiations would lead to the third 
phase of the accession process, the drafting of the terms of the membership (protocol 
of accession and schedule of commitments).45 The fourth and final phase of the 
accession process is the decision stage.46 The decision to admit an applicant to the 
WTO lies with the Ministerial Conference or the General Council, and it shall be made 
in consensus and failing such by a two-thirds majority vote.47 If the decision is in favor 
of the applicant state, the applicant will become a full-fledged member of the WTO 
within thirty days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification, by the national 
legislature, of its membership treaty (Protocol of Accession). 
Ethiopia is now on the first phase of the accession process.48 Needless to say, there 
are lots of hurdles ahead to successfully complete the accession process. As Pascal 
                                                 
43See, for instance, WTO “ WTO membership, alliance and bureaucracy” 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm#join> [last accessed on 9 March 2007] 
44 Ibid. Of course any concession reached between the member and such other negotiating members 
shall equally applicable to all other members by virtue of the MFN principle.  
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47Ibid 
48 The country submitted the memorandum of its foreign trade regime to the WTO on 24 January 2007. 
See also WTO, “Accessions: Ethiopia” <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ethiopia_e.htm> 
[last accessed, 9 March 2007]. Of course, few members have already started inquiring the memorandum although 
this would not amount to negotiations per se. See, for instance, allAfrica.com “Ethiopia: WTO member 
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Lamy, the former EU Trade Commissioner and the current WTO Director General, 
reportedly commented in reply to Russia’s complaint on its delay in the accession 
process due to disagreements on some concessions with some members,  
    ‘ …WTO adhesion [accession] is not political; it’s a process that consists in 
fulfilling rules and regulations that already exist at the WTO. When a country 
doesn’t meet them it doesn’t join.’49
However, such an assertion may not always be as sound as it seems. At times non-
economic (political) considerations can really shape the accession process.50
Of course, in view of Ethiopia’s being an LDC, it could be argued that it would join the 
WTO under rather an accelerated procedure by virtue of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, by which members committed themselves “to accelerating the accession 
of LDCs”51 and agreed, “to work to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding 
LDCs” 52; and the General Council Decision to streamline the process of LDCs’ 
accession.53 Seen in the light of the LDCs which have acceded to the WTO ever 
since54, such an argument would be a too optimistic speculation at its best and a mere 
“resounding rhetoric” at its worst as some commentators concluded after observing 
the fact that, LDCs’ accession process continues to be highly protracted, politically 
demanding and frustrating.55   
                                                                                                                                                          
states begin grilling Ethiopia” <http://allafrica.com/stories/200703200314.html> [last visited 23 March 
2001] 
49 Bossche(2005)112 
50For instance, Iran’s request to initiate accession procedures, first presented in 1996, was blocked 21 
times by the US due to non-trade related considerations. The WTO General Council finally accepted it 
only on May 26, 2005. See Simon J.  Evenett and Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade Note, WTO accession: 
lessons from 
experience”<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/TradeNote22.pdf> 
[last accessed 20March, 2007] 
51 See WTO (2001) Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, 20 November, Geneva, Para 9 
52 Ibid Para 42 
53 See WTO (2003b) Accession of the Least Developed Countries, Decision of 10 December 2002, 
WT/L/508 (03-0191), 20 January, Geneva.   
54  It took LDCs: Nepal 14 years, Cambodia almost 9 years, Veitnam about 12 years to complete WTO 
accession. As will be considered later, neither are their terms of accession seem to have been driven 
by the spirit of the differential treatment purported by the above declaration and decision. 
55 Ratnakar and   Dahal, “LDCs’ accession to the WTO: learning from the cases of Nepal, Cambodia 
and Vanuatu”<http://www.un-ngls.org/SAWTEE.doc>[last accessed on 23 March 2007] 
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The question when exactly will Ethiopia complete the accession process would thus 
very much depend on the pace of the reform of the possible WTO incompatible laws 
and policies back home, and the satisfaction of other members on the possible 
concessions and commitments the country is going to make in the expectedly 
strenuous bilateral and multilateral negations with the incumbent members. 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Since the establishment of the WTO as the only organization dealing with rules of 
global trade, a number of countries including a few LDCs, have acceded to it either 
because of the real benefit of the multilateral trading system or due to lack of a better 
alternative. In spite of the more favorable terms of accession pledged to LDCs under 
the Doha Mandate, there is little evidence that such newly acceding countries are 
granted significant differential terms; the accession process is still lengthy and 
complex. Although the global trade under the auspices of the WTO is generally 
considered as beneficial and a step towards integration into the global market, there is 
a general shift in the GATT/WTO’s role from mere trade liberalization to harmonization 
of rules, intruding into those areas that used to be under the exclusive sovereignty of a 
member. Thus, the extent to which a member actually benefits from its WTO 
membership depends on its economic competitiveness more than ever. 
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Chapter III-Agricultural Trade Liberalization under the WTO 
3.1. The GATT 1947 
Agriculture was one of the sectors regulated by the GATT 1947. Although the principal 
objective of the GATT, which was meant to provisionally regulate the world trading 
system, was the substantial reduction of tariff and other forms of trade barriers 56 this 
objective was not achieved as regards trade in agricultural products. While the GATT 
has successfully reduced the global average tariffs of industrial goods from above 40 
percent down to below 4 percent through a series of rounds of trade negotiations57, 
agriculture has experienced a reverse development of protectionism for the most part 
of the GATT’s lifetime.58
The reasons which make agriculture a prime candidate for government intervention 
domestically as well as across international borders (leading to excessive 
protectionism) could fairly be attributed to political, social, cultural and economic 
reasons all of which are entwined closely in the web of public affairs.59 It is widely 
agreed that markets for most agricultural products are unstable than required for 
efficient use of resources and efficient management of buyer’s expenditures; and that 
sizable price, output and income fluctuations occur in agriculture because of notorious 
inelasticity of demand and supply, uncertainties of foreign markets, the vagrancies of 
weather, and insects and diseases peculiar to farming.60
 In most nations programs aimed at protectionism are begun and sustained by political 
action; therefore, they are subject to all the mixed motives, compromises and 
crosscurrents of interests that political action entail.61
                                                 
56See the preamble to the GATT 1947. 
57The Multilateral Trade Negotiations held under the auspices of the GATT are: Geneva (1947), Annecy 
(1949),Torqua(1951),Geneva(1951),Geneva(1956),Geneva-Dillon Round (1960-1961) Geneva-
Kennedy Round(1964-1967),Geneva-Tokyo Round(1973-1979),Geneva-Uruguay Round(1986-
1994).And the Doha Round, which was launched in 2000 in Doha- Qatar under the auspices of the 
WTO is still underway. 
58 See Desta (2002) 7 
59See Houck (1986) 25f   
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid. See also Delcros (2002) 219-253. 
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 Thus the GATT 1947 allowed countries to use export subsidies on agricultural 
primary products, whereas the use of export subsidies by developed countries on 
industrial products was prohibited. The only conditions were that agricultural export 
subsidies should not be used to capture more than an “equitable share” of world 
exports of the product concerned.62 The GATT rules also allowed countries to resort 
to non-tariff import restrictions (e.g. quantitative import restrictions) under Article XI: 
2(c) when these restrictions were necessary to enforce measures to effectively limit 
domestic production although a minimum proportion of imports relative to domestic 
production shall be maintained. 
Owing to the stringency63 of Article XI: 2(c), no country has ever justified its import 
restrictive measure under this provision; neither were all countries fully convinced of 
the compliance of such GATT compromises.64 Some countries instead resorted to 
different measures, including securing waivers for agricultural policies (e.g. the US), 
negotiated exemption through accession protocol (e.g. Switzerland), grey area 
measures such as variable price levy (e.g. the EC), and still others continued using 
non-tariff measures with no apparent justification.65
Thus the GATT, which successfully liberalized trade in non-agricultural products most 
notably through reduction of tariffs, has failed to overcome the huge distortions that 
have plagued international trade in agricultural products. 
3.2.The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)66 was negotiated during the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1995) Multilateral Trade Negotiations for further liberalization of trade. From the 
very launching of this round, the GATT members agreed that agriculture should be 
                                                 
62 See Article XVI: 3 of the GATT 1947. 
63See the full text of GATT Article XI: 2 (c) i-iii for the conditions under which the provision could be 
invoked. 
64See Desta (2005) 19f. See also Houck (1987) 26. 
65Ibid. See also, WTO, “WTO special studies on market access: the unfinished business and the 
Uruguay inventory”<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/special_studies_e.html>[last accessed on 
Fe.28, 2007] 
66See WTO “The Uruagay round agreements, agreemet on agriculture” 
< http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#wtoagreement>[last accessed, Feb.28, 2007] 
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included in the negotiations.67 In fact negotiating the agreement was not an easy task 
at all. It was rather so controversial, complex, and strenuous that at a number of 
junctions the whole Uruguay Round was on the brink of failure because of agriculture 
and it was not before a settlement was found for the agricultural issues that the over 
all round came to a conclusion.68 Actually that was not a wonder when seen in the 
light of the sensitive nature of agriculture and the consequent protection it used to 
enjoy- and enjoys even today. The Uruguay Round is praised, inter alia, for the 
successful negotiation of the AoA, which is considered as a remarkable move in 
disciplining trade in agricultural products.  
 
The short-term objective of the Agreement is “to establish a basis for initiating a 
process of reform of trade in agriculture” while its long term objective is “to establish a 
fair and market oriented agricultural trading system.”69  
 
The agreement defines the term “agricultural products” as referring to both 
unprocessed and processed agricultural products to ensure that its scope would be 
well defined; requires the conversion of all agriculture specific non-tariff measures into 
customs duties (often called “tariffication”) which have to be bound; defines export 
subsidies subject to reduction commitments; and provides for a specific measurement 
of support.70 Put differently, the agreement aims at liberalizing agricultural trade 
market through conversion of all import restrictions on agricultural products to tariffs, 
which are generally presumed to be more transparent than their non-tariff 
equivalents71 and binding such tariffs with further reduction commitments from the 
bound rates. On the other hand, commitments on domestic support and export 
subsidies are meant to eliminate, or at least reduce agricultural trade distortions. 
 
                                                 
67 Olsen (2005) 43 
68 Tangermann(2005) 99  
69See preamble to the AoA. 
70 See Articles: 2,4,6-9 and Annex I to the AoA. 
71 See Desta (2002) 67. 
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The agreement, thus, establishes rules or disciplines on three pillars: market access, 
domestic support and export subsidy (competition). The need for express treatment of 
these three pillars is fairly clear, the mechanics of their being intertwined.  
 
For instance, if a given country extends domestic support to its producers, (e.g. by 
way of price support) it would entitle the producers to a higher price than they would 
normally earn from unsubsidized world markets. Such a higher artificial price will, 
therefore, attract foreign import, which will eventually pull the price down and hence 
defeat the purpose of the support. Such a country would only protect the administered 
domestic price by border measures such as high tariff and quantitative restrictions 
(measures which are regulated under market access rules). On the other hand, the 
possible surplus supply to domestic market under administered price could be 
exported only under export subsidy (which has to be disciplined by the rules of export 
subsidy or competition). Addressing one and leaving any one of these three pillars 
would hardly achieve the intended purpose of establishing a fair and market oriented 
agricultural trade; that is the rationale behind the existence of these three pillars in the 
AoA. 
 
Now that the Agreement on Agriculture has been in place for more than a decade it is 
worth asking as how far it has achieved its short and long term objectives? 
 
Certainly, the agreement can be said to have achieved its short-term objective of 
establishing a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture partly 
through the so-called inbuilt agenda (Article 20 of the Agreement). In fact, even 
current negotiations derive their foundation from the Agreement. Doubtful is rather the 
agreement’s success as regards its long-term objective of establishing a fair and 
market oriented agricultural trading system. 72 The success in the latter case is rather 
                                                 
72  It is interesting to note here the argument that the long term objective of the Agreement on 
Agriculture is not the gradual integration of the sector into the ordinary GATT rules unlike, for instance, 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; rather establishing a fair and market oriented agricultural 
trading through the establishment of a strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and 
disciplines which seem to signify the possibility for continuing to treat Agriculture by different GATT 
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a mixed one; while there is improvement in terms of complying with the commitments 
in some countries, over all only little has been achieved as the OECD countries73 have 
still continued to use protection and support with potential distortions.74  
 
As meaningful domestic support and export subsidy measures presuppose financial 
capacity, such measures are usually administered by the rich OECD member 
countries such as EU, US and Japan, although protection of one nature or another is 
presumed to exist everywhere. The prime victims of such distortions are developing 
countries most of which otherwise have a comparative advantage in agricultural trade.  
 
The full realization of the long-term objective of the Agreement on Agriculture, thus, 
seems to take long and painstaking negotiations as could be evident from the current 
Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
 
3.3. Agriculture under the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
As stipulated in Article 20(in built agenda) of the AoA, the second round of the WTO 
negotiations on agriculture was launched in March 2000. Following the stalemate 
reached at the WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun in September 2003, the Doha 
Round negotiations virtually stalled until 31 July 2004,when WTO members adopted, a 
framework agreement  (also called ‘the July Package’) that provides a road map for 
the next stages of the global trade talks.75
 
                                                                                                                                                          
provisions(different agreement)although such rules are expected to be effective in terms of liberalizing 
agricultural trade. For more on this, see O’Connor, supra n.20, pp. 418. 
73  OECD, with 32 member countries accounts, for more than two third of the world trade; its members 
are: Australia,  Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom,United States. See also, OECD “The organization for the economic co-operation and 
development”  
<http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html>[last 
accessed on 9 March 2007] 
74 See Tengermann (2005) 100-105.   
75 WTO, Doha Work Program Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 - 
WT/L/579.While this framework is not a final binding document it has a significant role guiding the 
direction of the future l trade negotiations.  
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 The framework covers three major areas: agriculture, industrial products and trade-
related issues. Annex A of the framework is devoted to modalities on possible 
agricultural disciplines. In general terms, the framework commits WTO members for 
strengthened discipline of agricultural trade in all the three pillars and recognizes 
special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries. 76  
 
In the light of the July 2004 framework agreement, the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference of 2005 adopted the agricultural negotiations Chairman’s report as 
annexed (Annex-A) to the declaration.77 That declaration was also more of general 
consensus, rather than clear commitment although it signalled convergence on some 
of the areas of the pillars of the AoA: domestic support78, export subsidy79 and market 
access.80
 
On the basis of the July package and the Hong Kong Ministerial declarations, the 
agriculture’s negotiations chairperson drafted the possible modalities on agriculture on 
22 June 200681, which was later circulated to members on 17 July 2006.82 Different 
                                                 
76 Ibid.  Members agreed to establish detailed modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect by a credible end date. 
Developing country Members will benefit from longer implementation periods for the phasing out of all 
forms of export subsidies. Higher levels of permitted trade-distorting domestic support by developed 
Members will be subject to deeper cuts, while developing countries will benefit from longer 
implementation periods and lower reduction coefficients. With regard to market access, tariff reductions 
will be made through a tiered formula that takes into account different tariff structures for developed and 
developing countries. LDCs are not required to undertake reduction commitments. Members may 
designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive. 
77 WTO, Ministerial Conference (WT/MIN(05)/DEC), 22 December 2005. 
78 On Domestic Support, inter alia, three bands of reductions in Final Bound Total AMS and in the over 
all cut in trade distorting domestic support, with higher linear cuts in higher bands has been agreed to. 
Developing countries will be in the third band. Ibid Para 5 
79 On Export Subsidy, inter alia, members agreed to the parallel elimination of all forms of export 
subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 
2013(fixing the date is one step forward from the July package). Developing country members continue 
to benefit from the grace of 5 years as provided under Art.9.4 of the AoA; the end date for the latter is 
2018. Ibid Para 6 
80 On Market Access, inter alia, four bands for structuring tariff cuts were agreed although the 
thresholds have been left for further negotiations. Significantly enough, Special Products and the 
Special Safeguard Mechanisms for developing countries shall be an integral part of the modalities and 
the outcome of the negotiations in agriculture. Ibid Para 7 of the AoA 
81Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Draft Possible Modalities On Agriculture22 June 
2006(JOB (06)/199) 
82 WTO, ‘Modalities on agriculture’< http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/mod_ag_2006_e.htm 
>[last accessed, 26 May, 2007). 
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WTO members and groupings have also continued submitting detail proposals to the 
Committee on Agriculture, one such proposal being the submission by recently 
acceded members (RAMS) demanding the implementation of the flexibilities pledged 
to such countries under the Doha declaration.83  
 
The chairperson of agriculture negotiations, Mr Crawford Falconer, has quite   recently 
come up with successive draft papers (“the Chairman’s Challenge papers”) on 30 April 
2007 and 25 May 2007, which are meant to provoke comments from members on 
where consensus might be achieved.84 As could be understood from the papers, it will 
be difficult to categorically state what the outcome will look like, as there are still 
various areas of divergence.85 Convergence on those matters requires political will 
and compromise especially by the developed country members. Needless to say, 
failure to make a deal on agriculture seems to risk the collapse of the already blinking 
Doha Round. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The GATT 1947 could not liberalise agricultural trade through tariff reduction as it did 
in other sectors due, at least in part, to the exceptional rules applied to the sector. The 
AoA negotiated during the Uruguay Round is considered by many as the remarkable 
move in disciplining agriculture in the three pillars of: market access, domestic support 
and export subsidy. Although no significant progress has been made in the Doha 
negotiations so far owing to the perennial issues in agricultural trade and newly 
emerging areas, the ambitious reduction of domestic support by rich countries and 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies as provided by the frame work agreement 
and the Hong Kong Ministerial are generally deemed to benefit particularly developing 
countries. Nonetheless, the elimination of export subsidy may negatively affect net 
                                                 
83 Negotiating Proposal By Recently Acceded Members (RAMS) TN/AG/GEN/24, 13 March 2007. 
84 WTO, ‘Agriculture: negotiations’ < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts07_e.htm 
>[last accessed, 26 May, 2006]. 
85 The areas of divergence include: Special Safeguard Mechanisms which was pledged by the Hong 
Kong Ministerial to form an integral part of the negotiations and out come, issues of recently acceded 
members (RAM), tariff escalation, etcetera. 
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food importing countries, which are presumed to benefit from lower price of subsidized 
food products. 
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Chapter IV- Implications of Ethiopia’s Accession to the WTO on the 
Agricultural Sector 
4.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters set out the general principles of WTO accession and the 
agricultural trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO. This chapter aims at addressing 
the possible implications of Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO on the agricultural sector. 
The significance of the agricultural sector for the Ethiopian economy will be highlighted 
and the implications will be approached in view of the three pillars of the AoA, namely-
market access, domestic support and export (competition) subsidy. As food security is 
intertwined with agricultural trade, this chapter also briefly addresses the same. 
4.2.What is agriculture for Ethiopia?  
Apart from the socio-cultural values it represents, agriculture is the mainstay of the 
Ethiopian Economy. The sector contributes a lion’s share in the gross domestic 
product (GDP), employment and export earnings. In the period 2000/01-2004/05,for 
instance, on average the sector accounts for about 45 percent of the GDP, 87 percent 
of export trade and employs over 85 percent of the population.86 Nonetheless, 
Ethiopian agriculture is principally subsistence in nature, which is characterized by low 
productivity and is vulnerable to considerable fluctuations in production volume and 
hence exports, as it very much depends on vagaries of weather.87
 
Most of the export products are raw products while there are few semi-processed 
agricultural products.88 The major unprocessed agricultural export commodities 
include: coffee (constituting on average over 35 percent of total export), oilseeds, 
pulses, fruits, vegetables, chat and live animals while leather and leather products, 
meat and sugar constitute the major semi-processed export commodities.89
                                                 
86 EMFTR (2007) 4 
87 EEA (2005) 145-150 
88 Ibid 150f 
89 Ibid. The structure of Ethiopia’s export trade has remained unchanged for decades except for the 
relatively promising cut flower, which has recently joined the list of, export commodities.  See also CSA 
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 Recognizing the key role of the sector in the country’s economy, the government has 
come up with an economic strategy called agricultural Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI), which assumes agriculture’s leading role in the transformation 
of the national economy towards industrialization and social services by providing raw 
materials, market base, and capital accumulation.90  
 
The policy anticipates that the extremely small ratio of urbanization of the country 
threatens to make the inadequacy of domestic demand a critical constraint and thus 
presupposes that, “…agriculture has to be made internationally competitive and that 
part of the production has to be oriented towards export.”91 Although the economy of 
the country has grown on annual average by 11 percent in the year 2003/2004-
2005/2006,inadequacy of domestic demand has so far not been a problem at least as 
regards food products. In fact, the price of food crops is currently escalating in the 
domestic market.92 Setting aside the evaluation of the policy for the moment, we will 
now proceed to assess as to whether the accession to the WTO will ensure the 
presumed and practical role of the sector both at domestic and international levels. 
4.3. Market Access 
As reiterated, better and predictable market access is one of the presumed benefits of 
membership in the multilateral trading system. The AoA also recognizes market 
access as one of its three key pillars. The pertinent provision regulating market access 
under the AoA is Article 4, which provides as follows: 
     
                                                                                                                                                          
(2004 Viif.  For the increasing trend in export of cut flower see, Ethiopian Reporter “Hope on flowers 
running high” < http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12904> 
[last accessed on 24 March 2007] 
90Ibid at 150 and 259 
91Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Handbook, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Vol.1 (Addis 
Ababa, 2005) p149. 
92See for instance Ethiopian Reporter “Business and economy: growth and its 
challenges”<http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12743>[last 
accessed on 24March 2007] 
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1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and 
reductions of tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified 
therein. 
2.   Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind 
which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties93, except 
as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5.94 
 
According to this provision members are principally expected to convert all non-tariff 
import measures into their tariff equivalents (what is often called “tariffication”). The 
resulting tariffs and all the already existing ones have to be bound95 and progressively 
reduced. As noted earlier, the rationale behind “tariffication” is the presumed 
transparency and predictability of tariffs when compared to non-tariff barriers and 
hence the potential for establishing a predictable market for agricultural products while 
the progressive reduction is, obviously, meant to liberalize the market further.  
 
Although reaching an agreement on such commitments under the AoA makes the 
Uruguay Round praiseworthy, the fact that some members bound their import tariffs 
far beyond the non-tariff equivalents resulted to what is often referred to as “dirty 
tariffication”-such high tariffs and the consequent high tariff dispersion between 
products (tariff peaks) have been observed as two of the most notable limitations of 
the market access commitments undertaken under the AoA.96 Tariff reduction 
commitments as envisaged under Article 4(1) of the AoA and the modalities 
agreement is, therefore, from the bound tariff rate (and not from the applied rate).  
                                                 
93These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import 
prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, 
voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or 
not the measures are maintained under country-specific derogations from the provisions of GATT 1947, 
but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-
agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A 
to the WTO Agreement. 
94Article 4 of the AoA, 
95 Note that applied tariff rate is different from bound tariff rate and that members may bind their import 
tariffs far beyond the applied rate-the reason behind having high bound rate being flexibility for 
protecting the domestic market from potential surge in import. 
96Desta (2002) 62.The fact that the AoA has introduced the minimum and current market opportunities 
and hence tariff rate quotas can undermine the potential benefits of tariff barriers over non-tariff barriers 
although that was a necessary compromise given the sensitive nature of agriculture and the diversity of 
interest prevailed among the negotiators at the time. Ibid  
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 What, then, is the implication of the accession for Ethiopia in terms of accessing other 
members’ markets on the one hand and opening her markets to other members, on 
the other (‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ sides as it is often called in terms of trade 
negotiations)? These will now briefly be considered. 
 
4.3.1.The opportunity to access existing and new markets 
As far as accessing other members’ market is concerned, though not as a WTO 
member, Ethiopia has had preferential access to developed country markets under 
such schemes as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)97, EU’s Everything 
but Arms (EBA) Initiative, the Cotonu Agreement concluded between the EU and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries98 and the African Growth and 
Opportunity ACT (AGOA).99 Apparently, therefore, Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO 
may not bring about substantial change in terms of bolstering access to such markets.  
 
However, the aforementioned preferential market access schemes are usually 
subjected to unilateral decision making of the preference giving countries and often 
based on non-economic concerns100. It is not hard to imagine how such grants would 
even be more unpredictable when beneficiary country is not a member of the WTO. It 
could therefore reasonably be expected that the accession would contribute to the 
predictability of market access. The special and differential treatment  (SDT) 
                                                 
97 GSP is a scheme by which developed countries give a more favorable treatment to products from 
developing countries on non-reciprocity basis as an exception to the general MFN treatment. The 
product coverage and extent of such treatment varies from one preference giver to another.  
98Under the Cotanou Agreement, the EU has been granting a quota and duty free access for 
agricultural products from developing countries. Currently, the EU is negotiating an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the beneficiaries, which is expected to be reciprocity based. EBA is a form 
of GSP offered to only LDCs, which enables them to export their products (except of course arms, as 
the name indicates) quota free and duty free to the EU market. 
99AGOA is another preferential scheme offered by the US to African countries. Although Ethiopia is still 
one of the least beneficiaries of AGOA, with the assistance of USAID, especially in the textile sector the 
country’s export has shown an increasing trend while there is also optimism about livestock products. 
See, for instance, Ethiopian Herald “Ethiopia: Ethiopia said performing better in 
AGOA”<http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270656.html>[last accessed on 20 March 2007] 
100Onguglo “Developing countries and unilateral trade preferences in the new international trading 
system”<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem01_e/ongugl_e.doc >[last accessed on March 
2007] 
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provisions scattered here and there in the WTO rules are also generally deemed to 
play positive role in this regard. 
 
However, even with the WTO membership, most of the SDT provisions of the WTO 
rules have long been mooted as either hortatory which fail to impose a concrete 
obligation on preference giving developed countries or simply ineffective.101 Farm 
subsidies in the developed world and stringent technical standards in those markets 
have rendered the utilization by developing countries of such preferential market 
access futile.102 Even more, as the trend of market access negotiations lead, inter alia, 
to a reduction of import duties (tariffs) across the board, the preferences will inevitably 
be eroded.103 Thus, it appears that the SDT provisions can hardly be a scheme to rely 
on by developing and least developed countries like Ethiopia. Yet, in view of the high 
tariff rate agriculture is enjoying in developed countries, as noted earlier, the MFN tariff 
may not render the preferential market access schemes useless at least in the short 
run.104   
 
Ethiopia’s big challenge in terms of market access would rather be non-tariff barriers 
such as technical and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. The AoA provides that 
“[m] embers agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary[SPS]  Agreement”.105 In general terms, the SPS aims at striking a 
balance between two competing interests- trade liberalization on the one hand and 
                                                 
101 See Hoekman (2005) 223-230. 
102 Ibid 
103 See, for instance generally, Katerina Alexandraki (2005). The issue of preference erosion is quite 
controversial especially under the current Doha Round Trade Negotiations. Although market 
liberalization through tariff reduction is the principal objective of multilateral trade negotiations, 
developing countries with relatively weak export capacity and least developed countries are not 
comfortable with the ambitious substantial tariff cuts in the developed countries’ markets for such a 
liberalization would subject them to fierce competition with products (usually subsidized) of developed 
countries and of other most cost efficient producers. The LDCs and ACP countries have formed the so 
called a group of 90 to resist concessions resulting to preference erosion. Ibid  
104 See also FAO “Summary of paper on the future of preferential trade arrangements for developing 
countries and the current round of WTO negotiations on agriculture” 
< http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3733E/y3733e08.htm> [accessed 20 March 2007] 
105 Art. 14 of the AoA. Actually even in the absence of this provision members are bound to give effect 
to the SPS Agreement simply because the latter forms part of the WTO Multilateral Agreements. 
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protection of human, animal or plant life or health, on the other.106 Thus while 
members have every right to regulate SPS measures within their boarder, such 
measures shall not be used in a manner that constitutes, inter alia, a disguised 
restrictions to the flow of international trade. The agreement also encourages the 
harmonization of such measures on the basis of international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations developed by relevant international bodies.107
 
Clearly, the application and harmonization108 of these measures pose a huge 
challenge to LDCs such as Ethiopia simply because the task demands adequate 
human and financial resources. The challenge to Ethiopia in this regard is of twofold. 
Lack of capacity to put such measures in place at home and complying with 
developed country members’ (often high level of 109) SPS measures.110 Thus SPS 
standards will be huge problems for Ethiopia to fully exploit the exiting and potential 
market opportunities the accession may offer the country. 
 
On the other hand, WTO accession may also have merit in guaranteeing the 
predictability of market access in not only the developed countries but also the 
developing ones (South –South trade). Owing to the increasingly stringent Sanitary 
and Phytosanitory Measures (SPS) administered by developed countries, the South-
South trade is rapidly increasing especially for SPS sensitive products such as 
                                                 
106 See Par. I of the preamble to the SPS Agreement 
107 Ibid Par.6.The relevant international bodies within the meaning of this paragraph include: Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and 
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention. 
108 A recent study revealed that contrary to the predictions by some consumer and environmental 
advocates, the WTO disciplines have not resulted in the ‘downward harmonization’ of regulations as 
countries are still achieving legitimate regulatory objectives even when very trade-restrictive measures 
have been adopted. See Orden and Roberts (2006) 22. 
109 See Jensen (2002) 2ff.  
110For details on the main problems developing countries are facing in the implementation of the SPS 
measures, see Standards and Trade Facility Fund, “Background” 
< http://www.standardsfacility.org/background.htm> [last accessed 20 April, 2007]. See also generally 
McMahon (2005) 207-221. Although developed country members are supposed to take into account 
developing country members’ interests while applying SPS measures (Art. 10(1) of the SPS 
Agreement), the Panel in the EC-Biotech case ruled that the provision does not impose a specific 
objective to be achieved which shows that such differential provisions are not as effective as they 
appear. See also generally Pevost (2007).  
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agricultural products.111 Admittedly, the south-south trade may not be much to be 
counted on as most developing countries have similar products (usually agricultural). 
Yet, the principle of comparative advantage may still be commendable here too as 
countries may concentrate on products they can produce more efficiently. 
 
 In fact, in the last few years Ethiopia has been exporting some of her agricultural 
products to other African countries such as the Sudan, Djibouti and Morocco; while the 
Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and United Arab Emirates have 
remained the principal destination of Ethiopia’s livestock products.112 Quite contrary to 
the preferential market access granted by the developed countries, Ethiopia has 
significantly benefited from the one granted by China to African counties in 2005-the 
percentage of China’s share of Ethiopia’s total export jumped from less than 2 percent 
in the years 2002-2004 to more than 9 percent in 2005.113 This shows that even 
developing countries can be a right destination for Ethiopian exports.  
 
Yet, such unilateral preferences cannot be counted on with a reasonable degree of 
predictability for the same limitations of preferential market access under different 
schemes we have seen earlier. Among other things, such countries can at any time 
ban Ethiopia’s products from their market if they feel like doing so as they are under 
no obligation to comply with the substantive and procedural rules of the WTO 
agreement, 114  as far as products from Ethiopia, which is not a member of the WTO, is 
concerned. Although bilateral and regional trade agreements115 may apparently 
                                                 
111See, for instance, STDF, “Standard and Trade Development Facility” 
<http://www. standardsfacility.org/background.htm> [last accessed 24Mach, 2007] 
112See Birhanu (2005) 95.  See also CSA (2004) iii. 
113See, for instance, The People’s Daily Online “China becomes Ethiopia’s major export destination 
<http://english.people.com.cn/200604/23/eng20060423_260496.html>[last accessed on 24 March 
2007] 
114For instance, Saudi Arabia banned beef import from Ethiopia several times. See also, New 
Agriculturalist Online, “Making more of the Middle East market” 
<http://www.new-agri.co.uk/06-3/focuson/focuson5.html> and BBC News “Gulf livestock hits Africa 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/941725.stm>[accessed 24 March 2007] 
115Until the end of the year 2006, Ethiopia entered into more than 50 trade and trade related bilateral 
agreements with different countries. See, for instance, EMFTR (2007) 158-166. Ethiopia is also a 
member of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). Id.170. While the Economic Partnership Agreement being negotiated 
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reduce any arbitrary action by the import state, such bilateral deals which hinge upon 
a reciprocity of one nature or another may not be an effective substitute for the 
multilateral WTO rules especially for poor countries like Ethiopia, when it comes to 
their enforcement116. If backed by predictable rules such as that of the WTO, 
therefore, Ethiopia may maintain and better access potential markets in developing 
countries with a reasonable degree of predictability although the stringent non-tariff 
barriers in the developed countries will still be a notable hindrance to such markets. 
 
According to a recent FAO report many lower-income countries, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, are less well placed to gain in the short- to medium run from of trade 
liberalization that includes improved access to export markets, or from further opening 
of their own markets.  117  The extent to which these poorer countries benefit from trade 
liberalization will depend upon their economic structures, their competitiveness and 
their capacity to respond to new market incentives.118 
 
Along the same line, Ethiopia’s handicap in utilizing both the existing and potential 
markets is the supply side constraints which include: poor educational and health 
status of the population, limited production capacity, lack of appropriate agricultural 
technology and input, institutional constraints and lack of infrastructure.119 If such 
supply side constraints are curbed, which principally require financial capacity of 
course, the multilateral WTO rules can definitely offer Ethiopia more predictable 
market access than bilateral and other arrangements with loose enforcement 
mechanisms. In the mean time, if backed by good governance, the accession can 
attract foreign direct investment, which can diversify the production base and 
contribute in curbing such constraints. 
                                                                                                                                                          
between the EU and ACP countries (Ethiopia included) may have it’s own implication on Ethiopia, it is 
not the aim of the present work to address this issue owing to the scope of this work. 
116As we noted earlier, multilateral approach of the WTO to trade deals has well been recognized as 
one of the benefits of LDC’s accession to the WTO. 
117 FAO ‘New trade rules expected to benefit some developing countries’   
<http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000536/index.html >[last accessed on 26 March, 2007] 
118 Ibid 
119 Birhanu (2005) 69 and 70 
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4.3.2.The commitment to open market for other members 
Obviously, accessing other members’ markets and letting other members into one’s 
market are the two sides of a coin. As noted earlier, the AoA, as a rule, requires 
member states to reduce their import tariffs. Although Article 4 of the AoA is a rather 
general provision in this regard, the modalities agreement120 provides for the details of 
such tariff reduction commitments.  
According to the modalities agreement, therefore, developed country members shall 
reduce their customs duties, including those resulting from “tariffication”, over a six 
year period (commencing from 1995) on simple average basis by 36 percent with a 
minimum rate of reduction of 15 percent for each tariff line (per product).121 Where 
there are no significant imports, a minimum access opportunity which shall, in the first 
year of implementation (1995), represent at least 3 percent of the domestic 
consumption in the base period 1986-1988 and gradually expand to reach 5 percent of 
the base figure at the end of the implementation period shall be established.122 On the 
other hand, where the current access opportunities are in excess of the minimum 
access opportunity (as considered above), they shall simply be maintained and 
expanded over the implementation period; that is, through reduction on simple 
average basis by 36 percent and minimum tariff line of 15 percent.123
By virtue of the special and differential treatment, developing countries’ tariff reduction 
commitment is only two thirds of that of the developed countries; that is, 24 percent 
                                                 
120GATT, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Program 
(MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 20) Dec.1993. Although the provisions of the Modalities Agreement shall not be 
used as a basis for dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO (See the Introductory part of 
Modalities Agreement) the agreement provides for fair details of the otherwise general AoA.  
121Ibid Para 5.Note also that the reduction commitment in both over all averages for agricultural 
products and individual product tariff line is computed on simple average, not trade weighted, in a 
sense that the calculation is made by taking the mean of all tariff lines considered on equal basis 
regardless of the amount or value of trade represented by each of those tariff lines. This computation 
allowed especially developed countries to reduce their high tariffs by low rates and their low tariffs by 
high rate, which reduced the immediate benefit of the tariff reduction commitments as some products 
continued to enjoy the protection of tariff peaks. See also Desta (2002) 73f. 
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid, Para 6 
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average and 10 percent per tariff line.124 Least developed countries, on the other 
hand, are exempted from tariff reduction commitments.125
Ethiopia as an LDC is, therefore, under no obligation to reduce her tariff rates under 
the AoA although she is required to “tariffy” her non-tariff import restriction measures, 
if any, and bind the same and all existing tariffs against future increase. 
Owing to the IMF-World Bank supported structural adjustment programs (SAP) 
Ethiopia has been undertaking since 1992, the maximum import tariff has been 
reduced from 230 percent to 35 percent and her average import tariff from 41.6 
percent to 17.5 percent while tariff bands have been reduced from 23 to 6 including 
zero rate bands.126 Ethiopia’s average Agricultural import tariff is 15.5 percent.127 It is 
evident, therefore, that Ethiopia’s applied tariff is considerably low and such level of 
tariff reduction, “is not only WTO-plus liberalization, but also makes the country one of 
the most liberal traders in the world.”128   
Although, as noted earlier, Ethiopia is not required to reduce her tariffs under the AoA, 
there could be a possibility for further reduction as, for instance, inter-sector 
concessions and also there can be pressure for lower bound rates during the 
accession negotiations. In fact, other LDCs, which have acceded to the WTO, were 
forced to bind their agricultural import duties at a lower rate compared to the 
incumbent members. For instance, Cambodia’s applied rate at the time of accession 
negotiation was 16.4 percent; although Cambodia offered a 44 percent average bound 
rate, the final bound rate was only 30.88 percent.129 Nepal, which had an applied rate 
of 11 percent and offered a bound rate of 60 percent, was finally conceded only a 
bound rate of 42 percent.130 Thus, for Ethiopia, which has an applied rate of 15.5 
                                                 
124 Ibid, Para 15 and Article 15(2) of the AoA 
125 Ibid, Para 16 and Article 15(2) of the AoA 
126 See EMFTR (2007) 37. 
127 Birhanu (2005) 64 
128 Ibid 
129 Oxfam International, “Cambodia’s accession to the WTO” 
<http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/Cambodia's%20Accession%20to%20the%20WTO.ht
m >[last accessed 27 May, 2007] 
130 LDCs WTO Accession “ Learning from the Cases of Nepal, Cambodia and Vanuatu” 
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percent, one cannot expect a bound rate that goes far beyond what these countries 
were conceded. 
The danger of such a low tariff rate is the possible surge in imports, which is likely to 
adversely affect the livelihood of millions of subsistence farmers. In fact, under the 
AoA, members can use Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ), which allows for country specific 
allocation of import quota (originally meant to encourage the import of products which 
were protected by non tariff barriers) and the special safeguard (SSG) provisions 
which enable the import state to increase its import duties beyond what is provided in 
its schedule of commitments if the required levels of price and /or volume trigger is 
met131 to regulate, at least partly, the mechanics in their domestic market. Compared 
to the General Safeguard Mechanisms of the GATT, the SSG provisions are easier to 
invoke as, inter alia, the import state need not prove the damage to the local industry 
(producers) in the latter case.132  
However, SSG applies only to those products that were subject to other import 
restrictions than ordinary tariffs (which, however, have to be “tariffied” as per Article 
4(2) of the AoA)133 and TQR are also generally taken as an extension of “tariffication” 
process.134 Such measures are, therefore, unlikely concessions for Ethiopia which 
does not administer such measures on import of agricultural products. The only 
notable exception is the prohibition of import or sale of genetically modified seeds 
whose second generation cannot germinate or seeds with terminator gin 
technology.135
                                                                                                                                                          
 < http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:3Irq2wI6Q-gJ:www.un-
ngls.org/SAWTEE.doc+oxfam+on+ldcs+accession+to+the+wto&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9 >[last accessed 
on 27 May,2007] 
131 See Article 5 of the AoA. Although a number of countries have designated their products by SSG, in 
practice, only few have used it. See  
132 See, for instance, Desta, (2002) 86f. Although a number of countries have designated their products 
by SSG, in practice, only few have used it. Ibid at 92 
133 See Article 5(1) of the AoA. 
134  GATT, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform 
Program (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 20) Dec.1993, Para 4 and Annex 3. See also O’Connor (2005) 71f.   
135 See Article 25 Sub Article 6 of Proclamation No. 206/2000. 
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 In fact, in the face of the fact that other countries that have recently acceded to the 
WTO such as Vietnam have not secured the SSG concession136, obtaining the same 
concession for Ethiopia might be unlikely, if not impossible.  137  Of course, TRQ and 
SSG are among the subjects of the current trade negotiations.138 Therefore, if the 
round is successfully completed and simplified forms of SSG are recognized before 
Ethiopia completes the accession negations, there could be a room for designating at 
least some of the agricultural products under SSG provisions.   
4.4. Domestic Support 
For the purpose of the AoA, domestic support, otherwise called, domestic subsidies, is 
an aid (short of export subsidy) granted to agricultural production that aims at 
guaranteeing producers a certain minimum level of income which usually involves 
market price support and similar methods of transferring resources from the non-
farming community to the farmers.139 While the market access and export subsidy 
pillars of the AoA were introduced in an effort to bring agriculture closer to the main 
stream rules of the GATT, domestic support was introduced as a distinct regime for 
the first time by the AoA with the recognition of same as the root cause of agricultural 
trade distortion.140
Admittedly, not all domestic support measures are equally trade distorting. In an effort 
to differentiate between domestic measures on their degree of trade-distorting, the 
AoA negotiators have come up with distinctions between support measures labeled 
                                                 
136 See for instance, Oxfam (2005) Do as I say, not as I do: The Unfair Terms for Vietnam’s Entry to the 
WTO, Oxfam Briefing Note, also available at 
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bn_vietnam.htm>[last accessed on 25 March 2007] 
137Absent concession on the SSG, Ethiopia can use the balance of payment (BoP) provisions to guard 
the domestic market if her imports hugely surpass her export. (See Articles 12 and18 of the GATT 
1994). Note that under the current Doha round of trade negotiations developing and least developed 
countries are pushing for a more simplified Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) and balance of 
payments provisions. 
138See WTO, Doha Work Program Decision Adopted by the General Council (WT/L/579), 1 August 
2004. 
139Delcros(2002) 235. See also Desta(2005) 23. 
140Ibid. For the intertwined nature of the three pillars of the AoA, see the section on the Agricultural 
Trade Liberalization under the AoA. 
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different colours analogous to a traffic light although no such colour has been 
mentioned in the agreement itself.  
Accordingly, those measures that were found to be more than minimally trade-
distorting (“Amber Box” measures) are subjected to reduction commitments while 
those that were agreed to be non- or minimally trade-distorting (“Green Box” 
measures) are exempted from such commitments.141  Exempted from reduction 
commitments are also the third sub-group of still trade distorting measures boxed 
separately (“Blue Box” measures),142 Developmental Measures (SDT for developing 
countries)143, and de minimis levels of support.144 The de minimis level of support for 
developing countries is 10 percent.145
 
Supports provided to basic agricultural production under non-exempted policies are 
subject to reduction commitments expressed in terms of the total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS), which is the sum of expenditures on non-exempted 
domestic support, aggregated across all commodities and policies using the base 
period 1986-1988.146 Thus members shall reduce Base Total AMS by 20 percent in 
equal annual installments over the implementation period.147 Owing to the SDT, 
developing countries have the flexibility to implement a 13.3 percent reduction 
commitment over 10 years while LDCs are not required to undertake the reduction 
                                                 
141Ibid, at 25.  “Green Box” measures as provided under Annex 2 of the AoA include: general services, 
including research, pest and disease control, training, extension, inspection, marketing and promotion 
services, and infrastructural services; food security stocks; domestic food aid; and direct payments to 
producers, including decoupled income support, income insurance and safety-net programs, disaster 
relief, producer or resource retirement schemes, investment aids, environmental programs, and 
regional assistance programs. 
142See Article 6(5) of the AoA. Note that the “Blue Box” which is usually expressed in the form of price 
support was a last minute compromise between the EU and US (often called “Blair House Accord”-after 
the name the meeting hall where the deal was reached). 
143See Article 6 of the AoA. These measures include: investment subsidies which are generally 
available to agriculture in developing countries; agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-
income or resource-poor producers in developing countries; and domestic support to producers in 
developing countries to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.  
144 Product specific and non-product specific support measures, which do not exceed 5 percent of the 
total value of agricultural production, shall not be included to the reduction calculation. Ibid Article 
6(4)(a) of the AoA. 
145 Ibid Article 4(b) 
146See generally Articles 1(2) and 7(2) of the AoA, and Annexes 3 and 4 thereto. 
147 Ibid. See also GATT, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the 
Reform Program (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) 20 December 1993, Annex 5 and 6 
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commitment.148 The planned annual reduction commitments are included in part IV of 
members’ schedule of commitment. 
 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that in the face of the expiry of the implementation 
period and hence the quantity to be reduced over the period, which has not yet been 
substituted by binding modalities, for countries yet to accede to the WTO, including 
Ethiopia, such terms as reduction commitments are subject to the accession 
negotiations under Art XII of the WTO agreement as noted under chapter two of this 
study. However, by virtue of Article 15(2) of the AoA which gives developing countries 
a 10 years flexibility period for the implementation of the reduction commitment and 
exempts LDCs from such undertaking, Ethiopia shall not be expected to reduce such 
measures, if any (as we shall see later) although she may be required not to bound 
the same. With this in mind, let us now see some of the domestic support measures 
Ethiopia is administering or planning to administer. 
Before the regime change in 1991 and consequent economic liberalization through the 
SAP, which was introduced in 1992/93 as shown earlier, Ethiopia’s agriculture was 
characterized by extensive government intervention. Notably subsidies have been 
effected through maintaining overvalued exchange rate and preferential interest rate 
on credit as well as direct budgetary support for agricultural inputs, especially for 
fertilizers.149 On the other hand, crop prices were kept lower than their market value, 
using government parastatal marketing institutions, in order to insure a staple and low 
food price for urban consumers.150
As reiterated, most of the above and similar measures, which have otherwise 
constituted AMS measures, have been eliminated under the SAP. And virtually all the 
domestic support measures (policies) currently in place could fall under the green box 
and development box policies, which are exempted from reduction commitments.151 It 
                                                 
148 Ibid 
149 See, for instance, Mohammed (1995) 1. 
150 Ibid.  
151 For details of the policies the government is now using, see generally The Ministry of Information, 
Press and Audiovisual Division, The Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Rural Development 
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could therefore fairly be argued that the accession will not have a notable effect on the 
government’s domestic support polices. 
4.5. Export Subsidy 
Export subsidies (also called export competition) are special incentives provided by 
governments to encourage increased foreign sales. As noted earlier, Article XVI of the 
GATT 1947,which was introduced during the GATT review session of 1954/55,allowed 
the use of export subsidies for primary agricultural products so long as it shall not be 
applied to capture more than an equitable share in world export trade in a particular 
product, while the use of export subsidies for non-agricultural products was 
prohibited.152  Desta succinctly summarizes the same as follows: 
 
‘[Prior to the AoA], [t] he use of export subsidies to artificially improve one’s 
competitiveness on the world agricultural market was thus not a question of 
legality; it was only a matter of financial capability. Those with the requisite 
financial resources easily found themselves fighting export subsidy wars. And, 
as in any conventional fight, the losers were-and still are-the poor bystanders 
out there’153
 
The Uruguay negotiators, therefore, had to agree to discipline this blatant trade 
distorting practice. Accordingly, the AoA commits members to cap and reduce the 
level of their export subsidy using the base period 1986-1990.154 Ironically, however, it 
                                                                                                                                                          
Strategies, Policies and Principles (2002), Addis Ababa, (Translation from Amharic is the writer’s). The 
proposed specific support measures in the agricultural sector include: introducing menu based 
extension packages to enhance farmers choice of technologies; expanding coverage of micro financing 
institutions; expanding Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET); improving the 
functioning of markets for agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seed, etc.) and outputs; organising, 
strengthening and diversifying autonomous cooperatives to provide better marketing services and serve 
as bridges between small farmers (peasants) and the non-agricultural private sector;  strengthening 
agricultural research, extension, natural resource management, water harvesting, and small-scale 
irrigation; strengthening crop protection activities to reduce damage caused by migratory and  non 
migratory pests through integrated pest management approach including indigenous practices and 
pesticide application; and improving production and productivity of livestock through strengthening 
animal health services, improvement of feed and nutrition ,and breeding practices. See also EMFTR 
(2007) 49. 
152See GATT Article XVI: 3  
153 Desta (2005) 22 
154 See Article 8 and 9 of the AoA. The type of export subsidies members are required to cap and 
reduce under the AoA in accordance with their Schedule of Concessions include: direct export 
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is only those countries (only 25 members –counting the EU as one member -out of 
150 WTO members), which granted subsidy during this period and hence could 
continue using the same within the limits provided in their schedule of commitment.155 
In other words, only about 16 percent of the WTO members reserve this right. 
 
 It is generally agreed that export subsidy is not a right policy to pursue for developing 
countries in general and African countries in particular. Regarding the latter, Mr 
Zunckel, a senior African trade advisor has to say the following: 
 
 ‘For Africa, providing no export subsidy is the right thing to do. An export 
subsidy is a direct transfer from the consumer in the granting country to the 
consumer in the recipient country. Making a transfer of tax revenue from 
African citizens to food importers (say in Japan) makes for fiscal nonsense and 
dangerous domestic politics.’156
 
 
Although the issue of agricultural export subsidy has been a big challenge to some 
LDCs157, it may not be a notable challenge to Ethiopia. Currently, Ethiopia does not 
use export subsidy measures for agricultural products.158 Thus, the AoA export 
subsidy disciplines may not have a bearing on the country in terms of changing her 
                                                                                                                                                          
subsidies, government exports of non-commercial stocks at a price lower than comparable prices for 
such goods on the domestic market, export payments financed by virtue of government action, 
including payments financed by a levy on the product; subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing 
exports, including cost of handling, upgrading and other processing costs and, costs of international 
transport and freight; internal transport and freight charges on terms more favourable than for domestic 
shipments, if provided or mandated by government, and subsidies on agricultural products contingent 
on their incorporation in export products. Article 3 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) also prohibits all subsidies on exports of agricultural 
products except as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.  
155 Desta(2005)23 
156 See Hilton E.Zuncle, “Adequately Boxing Africa in the Current Debate on Domestic Support and 
Export Subsidies”, tralac Trade Brief no.2/2004,Trade Law Center for Southern Africa, 2004,p.4.  South 
Africa is the only African country to reserve this right although it has never made use of the same until 
recently. Ibid 
157Cambodia was forced to bind her export subsidy at zero percent while the same demand, among 
other things, forced Vanuatu to suspend the WTO accession process. See Oxfam International, 
“Cambodia’s accession to the WTO” 
<http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/Cambodia's%20Accession%20to%20the%20WTO.ht
m >[last accessed 27 May, 2007] 
158 EMFTR (2007) 48 
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policy simply because such measures are not in place. Of course, had such policies 
been in place, they could have been used for concession purposes during the 
accession negotiations. In view of the fact the LDCs are not required to reduce their 
level of export subsidies, reserving the use of export subsidies may give Ethiopia a 
policy space, at least for the future use of the same. 
4.6. Food security  
Agricultural trade liberalization can hardly be isolated from the issue of food security. 
In fact, food security is one of the principal reasons why most countries have 
embarked on a rather protectionist approach to agricultural trade liberalization.159  
 
Various instruments recognized the right to food although its exact nature and 
implementation has been mooted.160 According to the 1996 World Food Summit, food 
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life.161
 
 Recently, some civic society activists have come up with the concept of “Food 
Sovereignty” as a response to the spillover effect of agricultural trade liberalization. 
Food Sovereignty is understood to mean the right of peoples, communities, and 
countries to define their own agricultural, labor, fishing, food and land policies, which 
are ecologically, socially economically and culturally appropriate to their unique 
circumstances; the primacy of people’s and communities rights to food and food 
                                                 
159For instance, President George W. Bush in his address to the Future Farmers of America in 
Washington in July 2001, stated that: 
 ‘It’s important for our nation to build - to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country 
that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation subject to international 
pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so when we’re talking about American agriculture, we’re 
really talking about a national security issue.’  See the Whitehouse “President’s remarks to the future 
farmers of America”, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010727-2.html.> 
[last accecced,31 March 2007] 
160 See for instance, Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Adopted 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976.The right to food is also recognized in 
most national constitutions. See, for instance, the Constitution the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Article 90(1). 
161 FAO, (2003), 28 
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production, over trade concerns.162 While this concept doesn’t contradict with food 
trade per se, it emphasis that countries should have enough policy space to attain 
food security through self-reliant means (production or purchasing).  
 
The AoA also aims at ensuring that food aid should not be tied to commercial exports 
of agricultural products to a recipient country and that to the extent possible, the aid be 
given in a full grant form or on terms less concessional than under other instruments 
such as the Food Aid Convention of 1986.163
 
  Ethiopia has experienced critical food insecurity for the last few decades due to both 
natural (e.g. drought) and human (e.g. ineffective policy) factors in spite of ample 
potential for adequate food production.164 Thus, the country has been substantially 
relying on food aid.165 Of course, the government has been devising different policy 
measures with the view to ensuring food security. Inline with the National economic 
policy-ADLI, an extension program called ‘Participatory Demonstration and Training 
System (PADETS)’ was launched in1995.166 The main objective of the scheme is to 
attain adequate food production to meet the fast growing population of Ethiopia.167 
Recently, the government has introduced similar ambitious programs aiming at 
ensuring food security. 168  
As regards the measures at the multilateral level, for LDCs and Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries (NFIDC) such as Ethiopia, the reduction of domestic support 
and export subsidy by developed countries under the AoA may result in rising 
                                                 
162 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, E/CN.4/2004/10,9 February 2004. 
163See Article 10(2) and (4) of the AoA. 
164EEA (2004) 2000-209 
165 Eshete etal (2002) 144 
166Metaferia, Yonas, (2006) 230 
167Ibid 
168 These programs include: ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP)’ 
which covered three years between 2000/01-2003/04. Within the context of SDPRP and the 
subsequent ‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty’ (PASDEP) to be 
operational between 2005 -2010, the government aims at ensuring food security resting on three pillars:  
increasing the supply of food, improving access to food, and strengthening Ethiopia's emergency 
response capabilities (EMFTR (2007) 10ff). 
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agricultural commercial prices of basic foodstuffs.169 If donors are not left with surplus, 
which goes for food aid, the recipients will obviously be affected. Ethiopia can feel this 
effect irrespective of her accession to the WTO. 
 
On the other hand, at the national level as the agricultural sector has already been 
liberalized, further reform measures in the process of the accession negotiations may 
have its own implications on smallholder farmers. Unless a relatively higher bound 
rate is negotiated, cheap food products might be imported to the Ethiopian market. 
This may subject the subsistence farmers to fierce competition even at the domestic 
market.170 Here it could be argued that the country’s unique staples may discourage 
the demand for imported food products.171 However, this unique food habit can 
definitely change if other alternatives are available. Thus the possible cheap food 
import could be a disincentive to subsistence farmers, which may eventually derive 
them out of food production-risking a predictable food supply. Although cheap imports 
could be to the benefit of consumers, that may not always be the case.172
 
On the other hand, if Ethiopia lifts the current restriction on seeds with terminator 
technology, (which are often patented and hence protected under the TRIPS 
Agreement) the farmers may resort to such seeds for the immediate benefit of better 
yield. This proposition cannot be a mere speculation given the fact that the current 
seed supply by Ethiopian Seeds Enterprise is short of farmers’ demands. For 
instance, in 2005 the Enterprise could supply only 27 percent of the total seed 
demand for the country.173 This may eventually put Ethiopian subsistence farmers at 
the mercy of transnational seed corporations, which could be dangerous to both food 
                                                 
169Desta(2001) 452 
170 While this has not been the case so far n spite the low applied rate, the accession may give 
importers a gesture for predictability of the market, which would encourage the import of cheap 
(subsidized) products. 
171 The notable staples of Ethiopia include “teff” which grows only in Ethiopia and perhaps in Eritrea and 
“inset”-a staple food particularly in the Southern part of Ethiopia. 
172 Contrary to the conventional belief, there is no grantee that even consumers will benefit from such 
cheap imports as was seen in Mexico and Zambia.  See United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean 
Ziegler, E/CN.4/2004/10,9 February 2004. 
173 Ahmed et.el (2006) 246 
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security and biodiversity. Thus the government should strengthen the production of 
improved seeds through the current extension programs. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
Agriculture is the driving force of the Ethiopian economy, which is also recognized by 
adopting a policy that attaches priority to the sector. Most of the existing agricultural 
policies on agriculture are compatible with the AoA provisions as they relate to LDCs. 
Regarding market access, as the country has significantly and perhaps unilaterally 
reduced her import tariffs and in principle does not administer non-tariff boarder 
measures, it could be said that the existing policy is compatible with the AoA 
provisions on market access. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether accession to 
the WTO of itself will bolster the existing and potential markets for agricultural 
products although it may better ensure the predictability of such markets. Virtually all 
the agricultural domestic support policies currently in place fall under either the “Green 
Box” or “Development Box” measures of the AoA, which are generally exempted from 
reduction commitments. As export subsidy presuppose strong financial resource, it is 
not surprising to observe the fact that Ethiopia does not subsidize agricultural exports. 
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Chapter V - Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1.Conclusion  
Since the establishment of the WTO as the only organization dealing with rules of 
global trade, a number of countries, including few LDCs, have acceded to it either 
because of the real benefit of the multilateral trading system or due to lack of a better 
alternative. In spite of the more favorable terms of accession pledged to LDCs under 
the Doha Mandate, there is little evidence that such newly acceding countries are 
granted significant differential terms; the accession process is still lengthy and 
complex. Although the global trade under the auspices of the WTO is generally 
considered as beneficial and a step towards integration into the global market, there is 
a general shift in the GATT/WTO’s role from mere trade liberalization on the basis of 
non-discrimination to trade regulation through harmonization of rules (standards), 
intruding into those areas which used to be under the exclusive sovereignty of a 
member. Thus, the extent to which a member actually benefits from its WTO 
membership depends on its economic competitiveness more than ever before. 
 
The GATT 1947 could not liberalise agricultural trade through tariff reduction as it did 
in other sectors due, at least in part, to the exceptional rules applied to the sector and 
also the members’ lack of adherence to the rules in place. The AoA, which was 
negotiated during the Uruguay round of trade negotiations (1986-1995), is considered 
by many as a remarkable move in disciplining agriculture in the three pillars of: market 
access, domestic support and export subsidy. While no significant progress has been 
made in the Doha negotiations so far owing to the disagreements over perennial 
issues in agricultural trade and newly emerging areas, the ambitious reduction of 
domestic support by rich countries and elimination of all forms of export subsidies as 
provided by the July 2004 Framework Agreement and later the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declarations are generally deemed to benefit particularly developing countries. At the 
same time, the elimination of export subsidies may negatively affect net food importing 
countries, which are presumed to benefit from lower price of subsidized food products. 
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Thus, it is at the time when no further concrete agricultural trade liberalization 
commitments are reached under the current Doha round of trade negotiations, despite 
a number of proposals, that Ethiopia whose economy predominantly relies on 
agriculture has taken a step for WTO accession by submitting her memorandum of 
foreign trade regime. 
 
Indeed, most of Ethiopia’s existing agricultural policies are compatible with the AoA 
provisions.  
 
Regarding market access, as the country has significantly, and perhaps unilaterally, 
reduced her import tariffs and in principle does not administer non-tariff boarder 
measures, it could be said that the existing policies are compatible with the AoA. All 
the same, the country is expected to bind all the existing import tariffs. It is also likely 
that further reduction commitments might be requested during accession negotiations.  
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether accession to the WTO of itself bolsters the 
existing and potential markets for agricultural products although it may better ensure 
the predictability of such markets. The main obstacle in this regard is the high level of 
Sanitary and phytosanitary(SPS) measures administered by the potential markets of 
Ethiopia. The expansion and effective utilization of the potential markets, as always, 
depends on curbing the supply side constraints. 
 
 Virtually all the agricultural domestic support policies currently in place fall under 
either the ‘Green Box’ or ‘Development Box’ measures of the AoA, which are generally 
exempted from reduction commitments of the ‘Amber Box’. In fact, Ethiopia can 
introduce, subject to no reduction commitments, the ‘Amber Box’ measures so long as 
the support does not exceed 10 percent of the production of the year concerned, the 
‘deminimis level’ –allowed for developing countries in general. 
 
As export subsidy presupposes strong financial resource, it is not surprising to 
observe that Ethiopia does not subsidize her agricultural exports.  
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On the other hand, the ambitious reduction of agricultural export subsidies and 
domestic support may lead to a substantial increment in the prise of food products, 
which definitely increases Ethiopia’s import bills. Of course, if Ethiopia boosts the 
quality and quantity of its exports, the reduction of export subsidies in the developed 
countries can be translated to her benefit.  
 
In spite of adequate potential for food production, the country has experienced chronic 
food insecurity for the last few decades due to both human and natural factors. In this 
regard, the possible increase in food prices due to the reduction of export subsidies 
and domestic support by the developed country members may affect Ethiopia, which 
significantly depends on food imports either in the form of aid or commercial import. In 
fact, Ethiopia would feel this effect irrespective of her WTO accession.  
 
At the national level, however, further reduction of agricultural import tariffs during the 
accession negotiations may lead to the import of cheap subsidized products. Besides, 
the importation and the protection of patent rights to genetically modified crops with 
terminator technology may put Ethiopian subsistence farmers at the mercy of 
transactional seed corporations. Indeed, the latter two measures may potentially 
derive Ethiopian farmers from the sector-which will endanger food security and also 
biodiversity 
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5.2. Recommendations 
 
In the light of the above conclusions, the following measures should be taken into 
account to ensure that the accession works to the benefit of Ethiopia. 
 
Firstly, WTO accession should not be seen as a sufficient condition for integration into 
the global market. The possible benefits from WTO membership generally hinge upon 
a number of factors including the economic and human power of a member, and good 
governance at home. Thus the government should exert an all out effort to ensure 
good governance and work towards improvement of economic competitiveness while 
also focusing on equipping its officials (negotiators) with the necessary knowledge of 
WTO laws and procedures. 
  
In view of the general consensus, at least under the current Doha round of trade 
negotiations, that SDT for developing countries should be a cross cutting agenda at 
WTO, and preferential accession process for LDCs (as pledged by the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration of 2001 and the General Council Decision of 2003), Ethiopia 
should adhere to more favourable treatment in the negotiations of all the three pillars 
of the AoA. While adherence to the pledge alone may not be enough to secure all the 
required concessions as could be observed from the experience of other LDC which 
acceded to the WTO so far, this approach can result in a reasonable degree of 
flexibility if based on specific justifications, including the economic realities of Ethiopia. 
 
Regarding market access, the country has already undertaken a substantial economic 
liberalization, which in fact amounts to a WTO-plus requirement. Unfortunately, 
however, this unilateral liberalization, albeit under the auspices of the IMF/World Bank, 
cannot be a ‘price’ for WTO membership. Thus, in the course of the accession 
process, there could be a possibility for further reduction of import tariffs and also 
concession for a bound rate, which may not be significantly beyond the applied tariff 
rate. In this regard, it is wise to push for higher bound rates. Such high bound rates 
will give the government a policy space to increase or decrease the tariff (within the 
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bound rate) with the view to protect the subsistence farmers without also harming the 
consumers.  
 
In addition to the general safeguard measures under the WTO, possible concessions 
for Special Safeguard Measures and Tariff Rate Quotas may reduce the risk of a 
potential surge in imports. Moreover, the extension of protection to patented 
genetically modified crops with terminator technology (in the event that the current 
restriction on imports of such products is challenged during the accession negotiation) 
may eventually put Ethiopian subsistence farmers at the mercy of transnational seed 
corporations which could be dangerous to both biodiversity and food security. 
Therefore, to the extent possible the government should work towards boosting the 
availability of improved seeds through the various extension programs. 
 
In sum, WTO accession does not have a significant effect on Ethiopia’s agriculture in 
terms of domestic support and export subsidies. Although WTO accession of itself 
may not bolster market access, quite in line with the intended role of the Ethiopia 
Agriculture, it can offer more predictable market access although non-tariff barriers 
(specially technical, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures) remain notable market 
entry challenges. Thus the country should work towards boosting the quality and 
quantity of her agricultural production and exports. This in turn depends on curbing the 
supply side constraints such as poor infrastructure and backward technology. In fact, 
the accession itself (if backed by good governance) can contribute to the 
government’s efforts in curbing some of the supply side constraints through foreign 
direct investment. If, inter alia, the above recommendations are taken into account the 
accession can benefit Ethiopia.  
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